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The following report presents a conceptual discussion of the
implications of maritime nuclear weapons for crisis management.
The Maritime Strategy proposes a doctrine for development and
deployment of U.S. naval forces capable of deterring war,
controlling escalation, and terminating conflicts on terms
favorable to the United States. The capability for effective
crisis response is an important dimension of deterring war and
controlling escalation.
This report reaches the following conclusions:
1) Strategic nuclear weapons have played significant crisis
control and termination functions in the past.
2) Current U.S. Navy maritime theater nuclear warfare
capabilities, by virtue of their dispersal throughout the fleet,
are very likely to be involved either directly or indirectly in
future crisis responses by naval forces.
3) Crisis response is a key feature of the Maritime
Strategy's plan for deterring war and controlling escalation.
4) Maritime theater nuclear capabilities may both enhance
and impede naval crisis management objectives. Specifically,
nuclear-capable platforms may enhance naval crisis management by:
promoting strategic deterrence;
signaling U.S. resolve to counter Soviet escalatory
actions
;
enhancing the U.S. capability to respond to a wide
range of nuclear and non-nuclear threats;
- vi -
demonstrating to allies the depth of U.S. commitment to
maintain alliance interests and counter Soviet and non-
Soviet nuclear threats to allied territory;
fielding a capability to handle specific war-fighting
missions (such as land attack) should the crisis
escalate to all-out war.
Maritime theater nuclear weapons may impede or complicate
naval crisis management by:
intimidating allies and neutral states committed
domestically to nuclear free zones;
inadvertantly increasing incentives for an enemy to
preempt naval nuclear assets;
provoking Soviet involvement, obliging the Soviets to
extend nuclear guarantees to allies who might feel
implicitly or explicitly threatened by U.S. nuclear
weapons; and,
displacing conventional munitions that may be more
applicable in limited combat situations.
The U.S. Navy must consider any crisis as a potential
prelude to armed hostilities, and it must be prepared to
transition effectively and successfuly to higher levels of
conflict at the direction of the national command authorities
should the situation and U.S. national interests so require.
Naval policy and fleet doctrine should exploit the positive
effects of nuclear-capable assets on crisis management efforts.
Conversely, naval policy and fleet doctrine must be prepared to
mitigate the negative impact of the presence of naval nuclear
weapons in situations of increasing tension and uncertainty.
- vii -

NAVAL NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Thus far the chief purpose of our military
establishment has been to win wars. From now on
its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can
have almost no other useful purpose.
- Bernard Brodie, 1946
Today there is no longer any such thing as
military strategy; there is only crisis
management.
- Robert S. McNamara, 1962
I. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
A. Nuclear War at Sea
Nuclear war at sea has been and continues to be an issue of
great concern to the U.S. Navy. The success of U.S. foreign and
defense policy rests on the Navy's ability to effectively respond
to a wide variety of contingencies, including deterring nuclear
war at sea. As one naval officer noted: "Ultimately, the success
of the United States' overall national warfighting strategy quite
possibly hinges on the US Navy's capability to deter or win a
nuclear conflict at sea." 1 In particular, deterring nuclear war
1 CDR Raymond E. Thomas, USN, "Maritime Theater Nuclear
Warfare: Matching Strategy and Capability," in National Defense
University, Essays on Strategy , (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1985), p. 41.
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at sea and on land is of primary concern to the Navy's long-range
planning efforts.
As the quote from Bernard Brodie given above indicates,
deterrence, especially of nuclear conflicts, has become the
primary function of our military forces in the nuclear age. A
nuclear war could occur as the result of an infinite number of
event sequences, both before and after other types of hostilities
have commenced. While the literature on this subject identifies
and elaborates on several nuclear escalation scenarios, there are
five basic paths that could lead to use of nuclear weapons on




(4) Escalation of a Conventional War
(5) Terrorist Actions
Surprise attack, or "bolt from the blue," is of significant
concern to military planners who are charged with insuring
effective early warning and survivable forces both to deter and
ride out sudden nuclear attacks. However, given the inherent
survivability of sea-based strategic nuclear weapons and their
large retaliatory capability, the surprise attack scenario is
often discounted by strategic planners.
Potential scenarios for nuclear escalation are developed
in, among others: The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living With
Nuclear Weapons , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp.
49-66; David P. Barash, The Arms Race and Nuclear War , (New York:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 66-177; Bernard Brodie,
Escalation and the Nuclear Option , (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966) ; and Herman Kahn, On Escalation:
Metaphors and Scenarios
.
(New York: Praeger, 1965)
.
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Accidents involving nuclear weapon systems have occurred in
the past, resulting in the establishment of a series of stringent
measures to avoid, or mitigate their consequences. Improved
superpower communication links also reduce the chances that a
nuclear accident would be misconstrued by the other side as a
precursor to a full-scale attack. For these and other reasons,
nuclear war by accident, as with nuclear war by surprise attack,
is also regarded as very unlikely.
Of the three potential pre-hostilities paths to nuclear war,
including nuclear war at sea, crisis escalation is often
considered to be the most likely. In fact, Admiral James D.
Watkins has observed that: "If war with the Soviets ever comes,
it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of
control. Our ability to contain and control crises is an
important factor in our ability to prevent global conflict."
This statement reflects a pervasive and implicit naval strategic
planning assumption.
Shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962,
Robert McNamara is reported to have observed: "Today there is no
longer any such thing as military strategy; there is only crisis
management." Two assumptions are implicit in this observation.
First, McNamara believed nuclear weapons served only to deter
war, not to fight them. He believed their only value lay in
deterring the use of other nuclear weapons — they could serve no
useful military function in an actual conflict other than
punitive retaliation. Second, if a war occurred, it would be a
spasmodic exchange of massive nuclear firepower — no strategy,
per se, would be involved. Crisis management had replaced
strategy as the planning criterion for the development,
deployment, and operation of military (especially nuclear)
"5
It should be noted that use of nuclear weapons could also
result from escalation during a conventional war. The scope of
this report has been limited to pre-war contingencies, and so
this fourth path to nuclear war will not be examined.
4 Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, "The Maritime Strategy,"
Special Supplement, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , January
1986, p. 8.
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forces. These assumptions layed the basis for current crisis
management principles — principles that will be critiqued below,
B. Research Questions
If it is assumed that nuclear war at sea is most likely to
occur as the result of crisis escalation, a number of questions
concerning the role of nuclear weapons in crises arise, including
the following:
What role have naval nuclear weapons played in
controlling or managing crises in the past?
How does the involvement of naval nuclear assets in
crises affect the nuclear threshold at sea and on land?
In what ways might naval nuclear assets enhance or
impede crisis management efforts?
There are also several policy-relevant questions. Assuming
for a moment that sea-based strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons could contribute to deterring crises from escalating to
the use of nuclear weapons, what policies and force postures
should the Navy consider in order to: (1) contribute to NCA
crisis management objectives? (2) promote successful resolution
of crisis situations? (3) prevent or deter escalation to nuclear
war at sea and on land? (4) insure stable crisis de-escalation
and termination? and, (5) in the event deterrence fails, achieve
U.S. objectives by terminating a conflict on terms favorable to
the United States?
This report undertakes to examine crises where nuclear
weapons are present or where the use of strategic or tactical
nuclear weapons may be an imminent possibility. The overall
objective is to consider how the Navy might be prepared to deal
with crises that either involve platforms with nuclear weapons
- 4 -
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capabilities, or crises that threaten to escalate to tactical
and/or strategic nuclear war at sea and on land.
C. Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Management
1. Nuclear Crisis Management: The Historical Experience .
The post-war crisis experience with strategic nuclear weapons has
been examined by multiple sources. However, the role of tactical
nuclear weapons in international crises has received surprisingly
little, if any, attention. This report will, therefore,
emphasize tactical nuclear forces.
One earlier examination of the U.S. crisis management
experience is of particular interest to the subject of this
report. A 1978 Brookings Institution study by Barry M. Blechman
and Stephen S. Kaplan examined 215 "shows of force" in the post-
's ... .
war era. They found 15 crises in which strategic nuclear forces
were involved [see Table 1 below], together with major components
of conventional forces. These were crises in which the U.S.
actually altered the status of strategic nuclear forces as a
direct consequence of the crisis in question. These cases
constitute about seven percent of the total number of crises
studied, and while this number may seem small in comparison to
the total cases involved, three factors make them noteworthy.
First, strategic nuclear forces were involved. By virtue of
that involvement, the nuclear threshold was incrementally
lowered. The United States upgraded the alert status of
strategic nuclear forces, or redeployed them in response to a
crisis, signalling the seriousness with which the U.S. viewed the
dangers to its interests in these situations, and the resolve of
the U.S. government to protect its interests.
Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S
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Second, the Soviet Union was an actor in 12 of the 15
incidents. In the context of post-war American foreign policy,
it is exceptional when U.S. and Soviet forces confront each other
directly in a crisis situation. It is more often the case that
the superpowers confront each others' proxies.
Third, Blechman and Kaplan found that "the overall outcomes
of the cases involving nuclear forces appear to have been
favorable in nearly every one of these fifteen incidents in the
short term, and in three-fourths of them over the longer term."
TABLE 1
CRISES INVOLVING U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES,
1946-1975
1. Security of Berlin, April 1948
2. Security of Berlin, June 1948
3. Korean War: Security of Europe, July 1950
4. Security of Japan/South Korea, August 1953
5. China-Taiwan Conflict: Tachen Islands, August 1954
6. Guatemala Accepts Soviet Bloc Support, May 1954
7. Suez Crisis, October 1956
8. Political Crisis in Lebanon, July 1958
9. Political Crisis in Jordan, July 1958
10. China-Taiwan Crisis: Quemoy and Matsu, July 1958
11. Security of Berlin, May 1959
12. Security of Berlin, June 1961
13. Soviet Emplacement of Missiles in Cuba, October 1962
14. Pueblo Seized by North Korea, January 1968
15. Arab-Israeli War, October 1973
Source: Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War:
U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument , (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings, 1978), p. 100.
That is, the authors found that within six months of the
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favored the United States, and that over the subsequent three
years, three fourths of the outcomes remained favorable to the
United States.
The authors found that there were three incidents where the
Soviets were not successfully coerced over the longer (three
year) term: "All the instances in which coercive objectives were
not attained were related to the security of, and Western access
to, Berlin, an issue that now appears to have been defused."
Despite the high rate of success when nuclear forces were
involved, a 1984 update of the Blechman and Kaplan study found
that: "There were no political uses of strategic nuclear forces
between 1975 and 1982 . . . American policy makers have evidently
lost faith in the political utility of strategic nuclear forces
ftin any but the gravest crises."
Why have U.S. policymakers apparently abandoned an
instrument with such an astonishingly favorable track record?
The first reason that comes to mind is that the strategic balance
has shifted from one of significant American advantage to one of
parity, or even Soviet superiority. In the study cited earlier,
Blechman and Kaplan considered the possibility that a favorable
strategic balance may have affected the positive outcomes of the
crises they examined. They subsequently discounted its effect:
[AJlthough outcomes were less frequently positive when
Moscow was most deeply involved, our data would not support
a hypothesis that the strategic weapons balance influences
the outcome of incidents in which both the United States and
USSR are involved.
Has the loss of American strategic superiority resulted in
the declining political value of nuclear forces to the United





8 Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War, 1975-82," Journal
of Strategic Studies , vol. 7, no. 1 (March 1984), p. 35.
Blechman, Kaplan, p. 129.
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responsible? (e.g. detente, arms control, etc.) Does this mean
that nuclear weapons will play no role (or should play no role)
in future naval operations in times of peace or crisis? Can the
Maritime Strategy afford to ignore the potential impact of
nuclear weapons on crisis management, especially in view of the
recent trend toward allied "nuclearitis" wherein traditional
allies are reluctant to allow basing or port calls by U.S. naval
vessels capable of carrying nuclear weapons? This becomes all
the more important in light of the possibility that greater
pressure will be placed on the Navy for forward basing of nuclear
assets as allies face domestic resistance to nuclear cooperation
with the United States, and the recently signed INF Treaty
reduces the contributions of European land-based nuclear forces
to deterrence.
2. Crisis Stability . Strategic stability — a central
objective of U.S. national security policy since 1945 — is often
defined as composed of two elements: arms race stability and
crisis stability. Arms race stability refers to a condition
where neither superpower has incentives for engaging in an
action-reaction arms competition. Presumably, such incentives
are avoided by mutual restraint in fielding weapons or defenses
that threaten the other side's ability to assure retaliation.
Crisis stability refers to a condition where there are no
incentives for preemptively attacking the other side's forces in
a crisis, or where capabilities and incentives exist for
deescalating an impending crisis. Crisis stability is held to be
a function of relatively invulnerable strategic forces. Colin
Gray poses the issue as a guestion: "in a moment of acute crisis,
would the strategic posture of the United States invite or
discourage attack?"
Yet, the calculus of crisis stability is subject to two
interpretations, based on competing explanations of what causes
crises to escalate into war. These competing explanations are
10 Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy ,
(Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1982), p. 68.
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often illustrated by reference to two alternative crisis
analogies:
The 1914 Analogy . According to this view, although neither
side intends nor desires it, war results from crises that
escalate out of control. Escalation control is undermined by
preset plans, little flexibility in either objectives or
capabilities, failure to exhaust all diplomatic options, and
complex alliance systems that convince leaders they will be
backed up by allies if confronted by the threat of escalation.
The solution offered by this view is to pursue limited
objectives, enhance communication, and avoid provoking the
opponent.
The Munich Analogy . According to this view, limited
objectives reflected in policies of appeasement fuel the
ambitions of expansionist powers. Crises that escalate into war
are failures of resolute action, as well as failures to correctly
discern the adversary's intentions. According to this view, the
approach of the "1914 analogy" may lead to fewer and more drastic
choices and the danger that appeasement may feed the expansionist
ambitions of the opponent. This view alternatively proposes that
crises be deterred or controlled by determined displays of
resolution and force, backed by a willingness to fight, if
necessary, for well-defined interests.
Current crisis management wisdom is most heavily based on
the "1914 analogy." Its assumptions and implications are more
specifically discussed in the paragraphs below.
3 . Contemporary Principles of Crisis Management: A
Critigue . There is a vast literature on managing crises in the
nuclear age. Much of it seeks to derive lessons from the Cuban
missile crisis — "the paradigmatic politico-military event of
our age." Most of the suggested principles reflect the
preeminence of the "1914 analogy," and urge limiting one's
objectives in a crisis, keeping communications channels open,
avoiding ultimatums, disregarding provocative actions, and
employing force with flexibility and self-control. Gordon A.
Craig and Alexander L. George have distilled seven basic
- 9 -
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1
1
guidelines for crisis management from the relevent literature.
They conclude that, for a crisis to be successfully "managed"
(read: ended without resort to war) , both sides in a conflict
must be willing and able to:
(1) Maintain top-level civilian control of military
options.
(2) Create pauses in the tempo of military actions
(3) Coordinate diplomatic and military moves.
(4) Confine military moves to those that constitute clear
demonstrations of one's resolve and are appropriate to
one's limited crisis objectives.
(5) Avoid military moves that give the opponent the
impression that one is about to resort to large-scale
warfare and, therefore, force him to consider
preemption.
(6) Choose diplomatic-military options that signal a desire
to negotiate rather than to seek a military solution.
(7) Select diplomatic-military options that leave the
opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible
with his fundamental interests.
While these seem like reasonable guidelines, there are some
caveats to consider. First, as Craig and George note, both sides
must adhere to these principles. Such cooperation cannot be
guaranteed. Second, the post-Cuban missile crisis consensus on
crisis management has been subjected to some recent criticisms.
Eliot Cohen, for one, criticizes much of the crisis management
Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time , (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), pp. 206-207.
- 10 -
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literature for its fixation with the Cuban missile crisis, which
he considers "singularly unrepresentative of post-war crises,"
offering "precious little historical guidance for American
IP ,
statesmen today." He asserts that five circumstances
surrounding this crisis make it exceptional, rather than
paradigmatic: "the real or imagined imminence of nuclear war, the
condition of American military superiority in nuclear and
conventional arms, the absence of the use of force, the
directness of the clash between American and Soviet forces, and
the brevity and simplicity of the event." 13 Yet, the author
continues,
as of 1986, the threats, and hence the crises, we will face
will not bring us close to nuclear war (unless the
conditions of parity change radically) , will occur under
conditions of nuclear equality (or even slight inferiority)
and dubious conventional strength, will involve the use of
force, will in all likelihood involve us with Soviet clients
rather than the Soviets themselves, and will , in all
likelihood, be protracted and politically complicated. The
Cuban missile crisis is and will remain singularly
unrepresentative of post-war crises, and it offers precious
little historical guidance for American statesmen today. 14
Cohen further faults the traditional crisis management
school of thought for making three dubious assumptions: (1)
rejecting Clausewitz's notion that war is a political use of
military strength (by discounting the primacy of the policies at
odds in a crisis); (2) asserting that the threatened use of force
serves only as a means of communicating with one's opponent; and
(3) assuming that the fundamental interests of states do not
conflict. 15
12 Eliot Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban
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Cohen believes that the traditional crisis management school
of thought reduces military strategy to "applied cognitive
psychology," or "the art of non-verbal communication" by assuming
that we have no real enemies, only misunderstood (or
misunderstanding) neighbors.
Naval policy cannot operate under such assumptions.
Conflicts may sometimes be the result of incompatible interests,
and U.S. policymakers must be able to discern when such is the
case. Furthermore, military force cannot be considered merely a
means of communicating or "signaling" intentions, although such
capabilities are critical to effective crisis management.
Military forces must also be capable of achieving predetermined
objectives (i.e. defeating enemy forces) should a crisis
deteriorate into war. For these reasons U.S. Navy crisis
management policy cannot rely solely on the traditional
principles of crisis management, as they have been derived from
the Cuban missile crisis.
4. Potential U.S. Objectives in Crisis Situations . The
potential objectives of the American government in any given
crisis situation will depend heavily on the circumstances
"I c
involved. U.S. interests in crisis management can run the full
gamut of implicit and explicit, declared or understood, national
security interests. Deterrence of imminent attack is, of course,
the primary function of American military forces in peace or
crisis, and the most important objective. This also includes
improving, restoring, or enhancing the U.S. deterrence posture.
There are other important U.S. objectives in crisis situations.
Restoring the status quo ante is often an important
objective of U.S. crisis management operations. It may include
the following types of actions: putting down a rebellion that
threatens U.S. or allied interests; restoring a regime friendly
to the U.S. or critical to other U.S. objectives; regaining
"I C.
The following discussion draws heavily on Leo A.
Hazelwood, Executive Aids for Crisis Management: Interim
Technical Report , (Arlington: CACI, Inc. -Federal , CAC-361A, April
1977), pp. 2-10,11, E-1,2.
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access to economic resources; restoring a condition of peace in
the event of hostilities; restoring the territorial integrity of
an ally; restoring a strategic, regional, or tactical military
balance of power; or, reestablishing a condition of readiness on
the part of U.S. forces.
Maintaining the status quo can also be an important
objective of military forces in crisis situations. This may
involve preserving fleet readiness; preserving peace; confirming
or reestablishing American prestige; preserving territory;
preserving a friendly regime from external threat; preserving,
restoring, or improving an alliance relationship; protecting
legal and political rights; inducing compliance with an existing
foreign policy; dissuading a given country or other party from
adopting or implementing a new policy; or, protecting a military
asset.
Accepting the status quo is not always in the interests of
the United States. It may be deemed necessary under some
conditions to seek a change in the status quo . For example, the
U.S. may wish to support a new government; induce a measure of
national reorientation; induce another government to adopt a new
policy less threatening to U.S., allied, or regional interests;
or, bring about a change in regime.
American National Command Authorities [NCA] may wish to
secure access to resources, allied territory, or other assets.
Or, they may wish to deny access to other powers. These kinds of
objectives will involve assuring continued economic access to
materials, resources, and capital; preserving or regaining
control of the sea or air; and denying control of the sea and air
to hostile powers, including terrorists.
Other potential U.S. objectives in crisis situations include
protecting human life, providing sanctuary or asylum to political
refugees, supporting critical negotiations, discovering the
intentions or actions of hostile powers, preparing for
alternative missions, supporting various United Nations efforts,
containing opponents, preventing the spread of hostilities,
preserving lines of communication, regaining a lost technological
advantage, restoring American prestige in a given region,
- 13 -
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preserving a strategic, regional, or tactical balance of power;
preventing or discouraging the proliferation of nuclear power;
preventing or discouraging the proliferation of other military
technology, such as ballistic missile weapons, land-based
shipping attack missiles, or anti-aircraft batteries; or, in
general preventing and discouraging the spread of communist
influence.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL U.S. CRISIS OBJECTIVES
(1) DETERRENCE
(2) RESTORE STATUS QUO ANTE
(3) MAINTAIN STATUS QUO
(4) CHANGE STATUS QUO
(5) ACCESS OR DENIAL OBJECTIVES
(6) OTHER OBJECTIVES
Source: Leo A. Hazelwood, Executive Aids for Crisis Management:
Interim Technical Report , Arlington: CACI , CAC-361A, April
1977.
Of course, the choice of objectives will always be the
prerogative of the National Command Authorities. The options
provided by Navy capabilities and procedures may, however,
restrict the range of choices available. It should be Navy
policy to provide the widest scope of responses possible.
Navy contingency plans should anticipate major categories of
crisis objectives, and be prepared to deal effectively and
- 14 -
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efficiently with them. In particular, the Navy should consider
the impact of nuclear weapons on the choice of crisis objectives
and on the implementation of crisis contingency plans.
TABLE 3
TYPES OF U.S. CRISIS ACTIONS
1. COMMITMENT TO COMBAT OPERATIONS
2. COMMITMENT OF SUPPORTING FORCES
3. REPOSITIONING FOR COMBAT CONTINGENCY
4. FORCES EMPLOYED AS A DETERRENT
5. MILITARY OPERATIONS
6. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
7. OTHER MILITARY ACTIONS
8. INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE CRISIS
Source: Ibid . , pp. 3-3,4.
To be sure, any value that nuclear weapons may have in
aiding the achievement of these objectives must derive from their
"presence," rather than their actual use. However, it should be
noted that the term "presence" should refer to perceptions of the
capabilities of the weapons themselves, and not merely their
physical deployment to a crisis location. It is primarily from
the capability of nuclear weapons to fulfill warfighting
- 15 -
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objectives or punitive threats that their crisis management value
is derived.
Maritime tactical nuclear weapons most likely to be involved
in crisis situations have in the past had as wartime objectives:
(a) anti-submarine warfare; (b) anti-air warfare; (c) anti-ship
• 17 .
warfare; and (d) land-attack missions. This array of
capability poses a deterrent to escalation on the part of enemy
submarines, aircraft, ships, and shore-based military forces. In
a crisis, these naval tactical nuclear weapons missions should
provide the Navy with the assets for both controlling the crisis,
and implementing an effective flexible response should deterrence
fail.
II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY
A. The Navy's Role in Crisis Management
U.S. national security policy reguires the Navy to be
prepared for operations in three different environments:
peacetime, crisis, and war. Both NCA and CNO policy directives
acknowledge the importance of naval forces for the conduct of
foreign policy in peacetime, the management and resolution of
conflicts in times of crisis, and the prosecution of military
objectives in time of war.
In times of crisis, the service of choice is the U.S. Navy.
In fact, the Navy has been the preeminent military force in most
discrete political operations undertaken by the United States
since 194 5. Naval forces participated in more than 80 percent of
the incidents covered in the 1978 Brookings Institution study of
17 • •Naval tactical nuclear missions such as anti-air and
anti-ship are gradually being replaced by conventional weapons.
In the future it is likely that tactical nuclear weapons at sea
will serve only in land attack, or possibly ASW, roles.
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the political uses of military force cited earlier; and reliance
on the Navy was the case regardless of region, time period, type
of situation, and whether or not the Soviet Union participated in
• i ftthe incident.
Naval forces possess a number of diplomatic advantages over
the forces of other services. These advantages include, among
others: (1) flexibility; (2) controllability; (3) strategic
mobility; (4) combat effectiveness, and (5) visibility. 19 Modern
naval forces possess a wide range of capabilities and a diversity
of options for responding to most contingencies that may arise.
Often, a single platform will possess the capability for many
operational tasks. Naval forces can also be diverted, deployed,
or withdrawn rapidly from far-flung areas of the globe --
contributing to their controllability. Their strategic mobility
is an often undervalued asset contributing to their ability to
achieve surprise for diplomatic or strategic reasons, and to
their ability to survive in war. Moreover, modern American naval
forces have an unprecedented degree of firepower and strike
warfare capability. Admiral Watkins further identifies the
crisis response advantages of naval forces as follows: 20
forward deployment
consistently high states of readiness
frequent exercises with allied forces





Blechman and Kaplan, p. 529.
Geoffrey Till, Modern Seapower: An Introduction
.
(London:
Brassey's, 1987), pp. 167-172.
20 Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 8.
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Because of these capabilities and features, the United
States will continue to rely on naval forces for important crisis
operations in the future, and the Navy has acknowledged this
responsibility by shaping a strategy to deal with it.
B. Crisis Management and the Maritime Strategy
The Navy's Maritime Strategy applies to the entire spectrum
of conflict — in peace, crisis, or war. In a major statement on
the Maritime Strategy, Admiral James D. Watkins observed:
Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict,
from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the
most survivable component of our forces for deterring
strategic nuclear war. The Maritime Strategy provides a
framework for considering all uses of maritime power. Among
the greatest services we can provide the nation is to
operate in peacetime and in crises in a way that will deter
war. [emphasis added]
Admiral Watkins further stated that "The heart of our
evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response... It is a global
strategy designed to meet a global and diverse threat, embracing
all possible theaters of operation and their complex
. ... ... opinterrelationships, in peace, in crisis , or war. [emphasis
added]
It is clear that the Maritime Strategy and its formulators
recognize the importance of crises as potential transitions to
full-scale war, and direct that Navy planning take this into
account. Crisis management is, therefore, among the Navy's most
important functions.
The Maritime Strategy speaks of the spectrum of conflict in
terms of phases. Phase I is labelled in Navy presentations as
"deterrence or transition to war." The objectives of this pre-







, pp. 8, 15.
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? 3
cede no vital area by default, and to prepare for global war."
Speed and decisiveness of response are further recognized as
essential to the successful deterrence of war in this phase of
conflict. Other tasks of this phase may include: forward
positioning of forces, commencing strategic sealift operations,
avoiding maldeployment, increasing readiness and alert status,
husbanding resources, and maximizing warning time. 24 The Navy
foresees promoting deterrence during this phase by "moving into
position so that forces can be optimized in the event escalation
control fails and we must face combat." 5
Navy statements on objectives during Phase I of the Maritime
Strategy recognize that actions must display decisiveness while
avoiding provocation. It is in this connection that nuclear
weapons may seriously impede or enhance the Navy's ability to
perform a crisis management role function. They may also
complicate both the Navy's ability to contribute to deterrence
during peacetime, and to successful war-termination should
deterrence (and crisis management) fail. The next section of
this report examines issues associated with nuclear crisis
management, including identification of maritime nuclear assets
most likely to be involved in a crisis, recent crises where naval
nuclear weapons may have been present, and the results of a
survey of the literature on naval crisis response.
pi
,U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, The 600-Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy . Hearings
before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials
Subcommittee, 99th Congress, First Session, June 24, Sept. 5, 6,
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III. NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT SEA
A. Introductory Remarks
The foregoing sections of this report have sought to
establish: (1) that escalation of a severe crisis may be
considered the most likely way a nuclear war would start; (2)
that strategic nuclear weapons have played a critical role in
crises in the past, and may again in the future; and, (3) that
the Navy has an important crisis management role — a role that
could either be enhanced or complicated by sea-based nuclear
weapons.
The following discussion seeks to make three additional
points. First, naval tactical nuclear assets are widely
dispersed throughout the fleet. This gives the Navy tremendous
operational flexibility to respond to a variety of both peacetime
and wartime contingencies. It also poses certain challenges to
Navy crisis management efforts. Second, a review of recent
crises involving Navy forces seems to indicate that, more often
than not, the Navy carries an inherent tactical nuclear
capability into crisis situations, whether desired or not.
Third, despite the importance of the Navy to U.S. crisis
management efforts, and despite the ubiquity of naval nuclear-
capable assets, very little attention has been paid to the role
and implications of naval nuclear weapons in crisis situations.
B. Navy Nuclear Assets
In order to be prepared to deal effectively with a wide
range of contingencies, the U.S. Navy has developed a broad
variety of nuclear weapons and deployed them throughout the
fleet:
The U.S. Navy maintains 9,347 nuclear weapons for 275
ships and submarines, and over 1,300 nuclear-capable naval
aircraft. SLBMs carry 5,632 strategic warheads, with
perhaps 450 more in the stockpile. . . Some 25 classes of
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surface and subsurface combat vessels are nuclear capable,
as are the support and logistics ships that carry weapons. 26
The following tables are derived from several unclassified
sources and while the information is incomplete and may not be
accurate in all respects, it is intended to indicate the
diversity and dispersal of nuclear weapons deployed on sea-based
platforms as they may be perceived by potential adversaries.
Table 4 is a summary of the numbers of U.S. Navy nuclear-capable
vessels. Table 5 is derived from several unclassified sources
and is a summary of maritime tactical nuclear weapons forces,
their numbers and launch platforms. Table 6 is a summary of U.S.
and Soviet naval tactical nuclear force loadings. It should be
noted that force loadings are in constant flux and the numbers
given are crude approximations.
TABLE 4








Richard Fieldhouse, "Nuclear Weapons at Sea," Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists , 43, 7 (Sept. 1987), p. 21.
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TABLE 5
SEA-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WEAPON WARHEAD IOC LAUNCH PLATFORM NO.
B-43-1 1961 A-6E, S A-7E 500?
B-57 1963 P-3, S-3, SH-3,
F/A-18 1000
B-61 1963 A-6E, A-7E, F/A-18 500?
ASROC W-44 1961 CG/CGN, DDG, FF/FFG 850
TERRIER W-45 1962 CG/CGN, DDG, CV 300
SUBROC W-55 1964 SSN 400
(ADM) B-54 -na- Marine Division -na-
(ADM) W-45 1962 Marine Division 310
TOMAHAWK W-80-0 1984 BBG, CG/CGN, DDG,
SSN 164
STANDARD-
SM-2 (N) W-81 1988 CG/CGN, DD 350
Sources: DoD, Soviet Military Power , 1987; International
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-
1987
,
(London, 1985); Thomas B. Cochran, et al, Nuclear
Weapons Databook, Vol. I; U.S. Nuclear Forces and
Capabilities
, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984), p. 244; and
Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," p. 24.
With such dispersed nuclear capability, any substantial
group of forces the Navy deploys to or near a crisis situation is
likely to have some inherent nuclear-delivery capability. The
deployment of naval platforms with nuclear-delivery capability
could critically affect the dynamics of the crisis situation in a
- 22 -
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number of ways. For example, perceptions of the stakes involved
could be raised by the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear forces;
and, these forces could signficantly alter the actual military
capabilities of the forces involved, thus improving escalation
control by complicating the adversaries calculations of success
and failure.
TABLE 6
U.S. AND SOVIET NAVY
TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCE LOADINGS5 : SUMMARY
U.S. SOVIET
CRUISE MISSILES 125 788
AIRCRAFT BOMBS 1,530 0*
ASW WEAPONS 1,760 1,278




Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . Vol. 43, No. 7 (Sept
1987) : 63.
According to the latest edition of The Military Balance ,
this figure may ignore as many as 600 Soviet nuclear bombs on
Backfire bombers assigned to Long-Range Naval Aviation. Air-
launched cruise missiles on Backfire and Badger bombers are
almost certainly excluded from this count as well.
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Whatever the impact of U.S. nuclear weapons in crisis
situations, it is apparent that they will likely be involved in
almost any contingency involving Navy forces. The following
section reviews recent crises involving Navy vessels with
inherent tactical nuclear capability.
C. The Implications of Naval Nuclear
Weapons in Crises: Literature Survey
As part of the research effort for this study a thorough
review of the literature on crisis management and nuclear weapons
was undertaken, with particular attention to the role of naval
forces in crisis situations. It was found that:
1) Major studies of Navy crisis management operations
neglect the nuclear dimension. Little attention has been paid to
the role and implications of naval nuclear weapons and nuclear-
capable platforms in crises, especially tactical nuclear weapons.
Although thorough studies exist on the employment of naval forces
in peace, crisis, and war, almost no mention is made of the
presence or impact of nuclear weapons or of nuclear-capable
ships. This is despite the fact that naval nuclear weapons
assets have been present in numerous crisis situations, either by
choice or inadvertantly. These earlier studies include:
Naval Studies Board, Some Naval Issues and
Options in Crisis Management , 1977.
CNA, U.S. Navy Responses to International
Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975 , 1977.
CNA, Planning for the U.S. Navy's Role in
Peacetime. Crisis, and Limited Conflict , 1980.
CNA, U.S. Naval Responses to International
Incidents and Crises, 1976-1984 , 1985.
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2) Official naval planning activities and staffing are, with
much justification, almost exclusively preoccupied with naval
forces and missions in time of war.
3) An exception to the apparent innattentiveness of the
literature to naval nuclear weapons in crisis situations involves
those studies that examine the crisis employment of U.S.
strategic nuclear forces in general, both Air Force and Navy.
These studies find a significant correlation between the presence
of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in crises and the positive
resolution of these crises, as noted earlier in this report.
IV. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT SEA
A. Introductory Remarks
Ever since the Navy acquired a nuclear delivery capability
in the 1950s there has been considerable debate on many issues
related to nuclear weapons and naval forces. Among others, these
issues include: ^
accidents involving sea-based nuclear weapons
attractiveness of ships as nuclear targets
launch autonomy of naval commanders
28
29
Blechman and Kaplan, cited in Section I of this report
See Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International
Security
. 10 (Winter 1985-86): 3-31. This article, from which
this list is derived, is representative of the non-Navy
literature on these issues.
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problems and opportunities associated with dual-capable
systems
implications of the U.S. Navy's doctrine for offensive
operations in forward areas
U.S. Navy doctrine for employment of tactical nuclear
weapons
Most, if not all of these issues have implications for Naval
nuclear crisis management. Additionally, there are other issues
of concern: (1) is it wise to assume that any U.S. -Soviet
confrontation is a potentially nuclear crisis? (2) To what
extent might crises serve as distractions for preemption or
surprise attack? and, (3) Are forward-deployed U.S. Navy
tactical/strategic nuclear assets vulnerable to surprise attack
in the midst of a crisis situation?
B. Issues Associated with Nuclear
Crisis Management At Sea
1. Accidents Involving Sea-based Nuclear Weapons . Accidents
involving sea-based nuclear weapons could include: a) accidental
or unauthorized launching, firing or detonation; b) non-nuclear
detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon; c) inadvertant
radioactive contamination; d) seizure, theft, or loss of nuclear
weapons or weapon components, or e) damage or loss through
- 26 -
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inadvertant attack. 30
Because of a long-standing concern with inadvertant nuclear
war occurring due to the accidental detonation of a nuclear
device, the United States has established procedures and
mechanisms for guarding against this contingency. The chances of
an accident triggering a nuclear war at sea are very low. These
chances may be increased, however, by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons capability, either among a greater number of
platforms, or among a greater number of countries with nuclear
weapon ambitions.
The chances of a nuclear accident triggering an inadvertant
nuclear war at sea may also be increased due to rising tensions
or the potential predelegation of launch authority occur during a
crisis. In fact, it may be reasonable to assume that a nuclear
accident has the greatest likelihood of resulting in a nuclear
war at sea if it occurs during a crisis. Therefore, safeguards
established for preventing accidents should be even more
stringent in crisis situations.
At least one author surveyed discounted the escalatory
nature of accidents at sea:
A confrontation at sea is less sensitive, and less prone to
accidental escalation, than a confrontation on land. For
these reasons, the use of naval forces is usually regarded
as less provocative, less dangerous and more controllable
than that of their equivalents in the other services.
See, among others, Milton Leitenberg, "Accidents of
Nuclear Weapons Systems," in Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, Sipri
Yearbook 1977 , (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977), pp. 52-82;
Daniel Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War . (New Jersey:
Allanheld, Osmun, 1983), pp. 155-166; and, Paul Bracken,
"Accidental Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale,
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks. Doves, and Owls: An Agenda
for Avoiding Nuclear War . (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 25-53.
Till, Modern Seapower
. p. 169. It should be further
noted that determining what happened in an accident or
confrontation at sea may be difficult or impossible to determine.
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Two U.S. -Soviet agreements also reduce the risks of an
accident at sea (whether or not nuclear weapons are involved)
from escalating out of control: the "Agreement on Measures to
Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and
the USSR," (1971) and the "Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Union of
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over
the High Seas," (25 May 1972). These agreements establish "rules
of the road," and require that in the event of inadvertant
nuclear incidents the parties act "in such a manner as to reduce
the possibility of its actions being misunderstood by the other
Party." 32
For these reasons, accidents involving nuclear weapons at
sea have a very low risk of escalating to nuclear war.
2. The Attractiveness of Ships as Nuclear Targets . There is
a popular argument that ships pose lucrative targets for nuclear
strikes, and that limited nuclear attacks on ships at sea would
constitute something short of a firebreak that the U.S. would be
unwilling to cross. "The destruction of large naval assets would
disproportionately disadvantage the United States, both because
of the enormous U.S. investment in its carrier forces and because
of the greater U.S. dependence on sea lines of communication."
There are several mitigating considerations to these arguments.
First, it is reportedly official U.S. policy to discourage
the idea that a nuclear war beginning with nuclear attacks at sea
would remain limited to the sea. This suggests that U.S.
planners reject the notion that a nuclear firebreak exists with
regard to sea-based forces and attacks on those forces.
32 Cited in Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea,"
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Second, it is precisely because the U.S. attaches such great
significance to sea lines of communication that an attack on them
would be deliberately and provocatively escalatory. This point
is certainly not lost on America's potential adversaries.
Third, before ships at sea can be attacked with nuclear
weapons, they must be located. One of the cardinal virtues of
naval forces is their mobility. That mobility enhances their
survival in much the same way mobile basing of ICBMs is said to
enhance their survivability.
Of course, the maldeployment of naval forces may erode
crisis stability and increase the attractiveness of ships as
nuclear targets. This is a consideration easily taken into
account in naval exercises and fleet doctrine.
3. Launch Autonomy of Naval Commanders . Ironically, the
launch autonomy of naval commanders may enhance crisis stability
by precluding a "decapitation" strike severing links to U.S.
nuclear retaliatory forces. The problem often identified in the
literature is with the possibility unauthorized launch. This
possibility is reduced by thorough personnel selection and
training procedures, by a strict requirement for positive launch
authentication, and by a "multiple-key" system of launching
maritime nuclear weapons systems. These points are likely to be
most severely tested in crisis situations, however, and should be
accounted for in naval excercises and fleet doctrine.
4. Dual-Capable Systems . Dual-capable systems — those with
both conventional and nuclear warhead options — have posed a
number of arms control and force employment dilemmas. They may
complicate or enhance crisis management efforts in a number of
ways.
First, by confusing the adversary about the actual
composition of the deployed U.S. naval forces, dual-capable
systems may introduce uncertainty in his calculations of U.S.
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intentions and capabilities, thereby enhancing escalation
control.
Second, an adversary may be forced to assume that deployed
U.S. naval forces are nuclear armed, when in fact they are not.
This may increase the tensions involved, and it may needlessly
push an adversary into contemplating or undertaking unnecessarily
escalatory steps. On the other hand, an adversary may
overestimate the firepower he faces in U.S. Navy forces, and he
may exaggerate the U.S. perception of the stakes involved, and
yield on points he may otherwise have not conceded.
Third, nuclear-armed dual-capable systems may displace or
reduce the stocks of more useable conventional warheads, thus
taking up valuable space on a finite number of Navy platforms
involved in crisis operations.
5. Implications of the U.S. Navy's Doctrine for Offensive
Operations in Forward Areas . In time of war it is U.S. Navy
policy to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces "as far forward
as possible." This is the essence of the Maritime Strategy. The
criticism this emphasis has engendered revolves primarily around
the escalatory dynamics of targeting Soviet SSBNs early in a
U.S. -Soviet war. The criticism has been expressed as follows:
This strategy contains the seeds of extremely rapid
escalation. It is not just that it puts Soviet SSBNs at
risk and hence could cause inadvertent escalation. Such a
strategy also makes it difficult for National Command
Authorities to forgo preemption. Being quite familiar with
the U.S. Navy's strategic predilections, the Soviet NCA
would have to move to disperse the Backfire force and to
"surge" the SSBNs at the outset of any conflict. This
would, in turn, put the U.S. NCA under strong pressure to
preempt. 35
Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International
Security . 10, 3 (Winter 1985-86), p. 23. For another discussion
of this issue, see: James J. Tritten, Withholding & Attacking
SSBNs . Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, NPS-56-88-004 , Feb.
1988.
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The assumption that the U.S. is initiating — and not
responding — to aggression appears to underly the above
reasoning — a dubious assumption at best.
The implications for crisis control of the Navy's doctrinal
and operational emphasis on offensive operations in forward areas
are not clear. On the one hand, forward deployed forces are
mandated by the far-flung national interests of the United
States, and forward deployment could deny the enemy important
advantages in the event deterrence failed. On the other hand,
forward deployed forces may risk inadvertently causing or
exacerbating crisis situations. The potential for crises
worsening due to the engagement of forward deployed forces could
be mitigated by the U.S. -Soviet agreements referred to above
establishing "rules of the road," and procedures for
consultations, and by clear delineations of U.S. policy
objectives in given crisis situations.
6 . U.S. Navy Doctrine for Employment of Tactical Nuclear
Weapons . A frequent criticism is that the Navy has paid
insufficient attention to the development of coherent strategies
and policies for the employment of maritime tactical nuclear
weapons. This criticism may have been alleviated somewhat by a
number of articles by Capt. Linton Brooks and others appearing in
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . The Navy does have well-
developed operational concepts for the employment of its nuclear
weapons, as do the other services. For operational security
reasons, the Navy, of course, is not in the habit of advertising
the specifics of its nuclear employment policies.
Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," pp. 23-26. See also: Joseph
D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, "The Role of the U.S.
Surface Navy in Nuclear War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,
108, 1 (January 1982), p. 58.
3 7 .See, for example: Captain Linton F. Brooks, "Tactical
Nuclear Weapons: The Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings . 106, 1 (Jan. 1980): 28-33; and,
Idem., "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
. 113, 4 (April 1987): 33-40.
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There does exist a need, however, for defining the role of
maritime nuclear forces in crisis situations. The Implications
section of this report will seek to address this apparent
shortcoming.
7. Other Issues . Is it wise to assume that any U.S. -Soviet
confrontation is a potentially nuclear crisis? A naval analyst
has recently observed that "all wars between superpowers are
nuclear; but in some, the nuclear weapons have not yet been
used." The same may be said of superpower crises. For
planning purposes, it must be assumed that if the Soviets have
equipped their naval forces for nuclear combat, and if that is
reflected in their training and doctrine, the U.S. Navy must be
prepared to deter, and if necessary, defeat, such capabilities.
To what extent might crises serve as distractions for
preemption or surprise attack? There are several points for
consideration here. First, the heightened readiness and alert
status of forces in a crisis mean those forces are less
susceptible to preemption by surprise attack. Second, crises
call attention to an adversary's actions. Intelligence
collection activities are stepped up, and wariness increases.
These are not ideal conditions for attempting to achieve surprise
against an alerted foe. On the other hand, by virtue of their
affect in focusing superpower attention on specific regions or
issues, crises may be used to divert attention away from an
adversary's preparations for suprise in another theater of
conflict.
Are forward-deployed U.S. Navy tactical/strategic nuclear
assets vulnerable to surprise attack in the midst of a crisis
situation? In calculating the costs and benefits of a surprise
attack, a potential opponent must weigh many considerations. The
transient or localized vulnerability of U.S. Navy nuclear assets
diverted to a crisis may be offset by the unquestioned
survivability of other retaliatory forces elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the essence of crisis stability lies in reducing
incentives for escalation in situations of increased tension. By
38 James J. Tritten, " (Non) Nuclear Warfare," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , 113, 2 (Feb. 1987), p. 70.
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presenting targets of opportunity, maldeployed Navy nuclear
capabilities may raise an adversary's calculations of benefits to
be derived from preemption. Navy training and fleet doctrine
should address such contingencies.
V. THE SOVIET THREAT TO NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT SEA
A. Introductory Remarks
The United States may face a crisis that threatens to become
nuclear in character due to the actions of another party and not
by its own initiative. The Soviet Union is America's principal
nuclear-armed adversary. Furthermore, crises that become nuclear
in character are likely to do so because of Soviet complicity.
The Soviet Union may interpose its maritime nuclear forces
between the U.S. and a third party, or it may offer a "nuclear
umbrella" to non-nuclear allies who feel threatened by American
nuclear forces in a crisis.
Because the Soviet Union is the principal nuclear threat,
this section will address some of the issues related to the
Soviet crisis management approach and experience.
B. The Soviet Nuclear Crisis Record
The Soviets have apparently made much less use of nuclear
"gunboat diplomacy" than has the United States. This may be
attributable to greater caution with respect to nuclear matters,
but it probably is more a reflection of the Soviet's land power
orientation. Stephen Kaplan reports only a single incidence of
Soviet nuclear posturing for crisis response purposes:
On many occasions, but particularly during the
Khrushchev era, Soviet leaders verbally raised the prospect
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of using nuclear weapons against foreign nations. Yet in
only one instance were data found confirming that the USSR
had actually raised the alert status of forces presumably
included in plans for nuclear attack upon the United States,
Europe, or China. That incident was the Cuban missile
crisis.
However, it should be noted that in a major study on Soviet
risk-taking and crisis behavior, another author has observed:
"Soviet behavior in the Cuban missile crisis appears in
retrospect as one major exception to traditional (and subsequent)
patterns of Soviet risk-taking, rather than as a confirmation of
such patterns." [emphasis in original]
There is another documented instance of Soviet leaders
"raising the nuclear specter," (although there is no evidence
that actual movement of nuclear forces was involved) and that
relates to border clashes with China in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Henry Kissinger reports that the Soviets quietly
approached U.S. diplomats and "asked what the US reaction would
be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities." The U.S.
vigorously discouraged such an initiative and Kissinger directed
that the U.S. draw up contingency plans for a Soviet attack on
China. The Soviets did not bring up the issue again, and no
attack occurred.
Whether he is referring to this incident or another is not
clear, but Stephen Kaplan notes at least one Soviet nuclear
blackmail success: "In the one instance when the USSR raised the
specter of nuclear war, China quickly compromised its position
39 Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed




40 Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Takinq and Crisis Behavior: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
,
(London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1982), p. 315.
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and sought negotiations with Moscow." 4 Kaplan draws the
following conclusion from this observation:
[T]he practice of nuclear diplomacy by the Soviet Union
might be particularly effective against actors over whom the
Kremlin holds a position of massive nuclear superiority and
when the issues are substantial enough to justify this level
of threat. On the other hand, the longer-term outcome of
Moscow's nuclear threat against China and the reinforcement
of Soviet conventional forces in the Far East — implying
Soviet preparedness for tactical nuclear war — drove Peking
into a larger nuclear weapons program of its own and to
improved relations with the West. NATO and Japan also
became seriously alarmed. 3
C. Soviet Views of the Military and
Political Value of Nuclear Weapons
To better understand how the Soviets may react to nuclear
crises, it may be useful to review Soviet views of the military
and political value of nuclear weapons. The Soviets see nuclear
weapons as serving several critical purposes. First, they
serve to deter attack on the USSR and its allies. In the Soviet
view, deterrence is primarily a function of the relative
warfighting effectiveness of the forces of given opposing nations
as measured by the so-called "correlation of forces." Nuclear
weapons have been considered the most important category of
measurement within this comparison. Second, the Soviets perceive
their nuclear forces as deterring U.S. 'aggressions' and
initiatives against Soviet allies, Third World countries, and
others. In this connection, Soviet nuclear forces have a clear
and well-defined role in the so-called "external function of the
Soviet armed forces," which is a Soviet phrase referring to
42
43





The following discussion draws on, among others: William
C. Green, Soviet Nuclear Weapons Policy: A Research and
Bibliographic Guide , (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) ; and, Leon
Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear
Forces in Current Soviet Strategy . (University of Miami: Center
for Advanced International Studies, 1974), pp. 5-10.
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foreign uses of the Soviet armed forces. Third, Soviet nuclear
forces are seen as symbols of equal superpower status with the
United States. Fourth, they are the primary component of the
"world correlation of forces," and as such, they represent the
most important measure of the relative strengths of the socialist
and capitalist systems.
Soviet doctrine and military posture do not distinguish
between deterrence and war-fighting nuclear capabilities,
but appear to view them as 'fused together' in dialectical
unity. The better the Soviet armed forces are prepared to
fight and win a nuclear war, the more effective they will
also be as a deterrenct to an attack on the Soviet Union; at
the same time, the ability of Soviet forces to fight and win
a nuclear war provides indispensable insurance against the
failure of deterrence.
Soviet strategic nuclear forces are expected to fulfill the
following missions: °
o 'reliably defend the socialist Motherland' and deter
attack upon the Soviet Union or its allies;
o in the event of any enemy preparing an attack on the
USSR or its allies, to 'frustrate' the initiation of
the attack and assure the 'decisive defeat' of the
enemy
;
o suppport Soviet foreign policy objectives by forcing
the West to deal with the Soviet Union from a position
of 'realism' rather than 'strength' and reducing the
risks of a dangerous Western reaction to Soviet gains
o deter the West from 'exporting counter-revolution' and
otherwise to stand as an effective obstacle to
'imperialist aggression' in the Third World; and,
o support 'national liberation' struggles and defend 'all
peace loving peoples' throughout the world.
45 Goure, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet
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It is clear that the Soviets see military and political
benefits deriving from their nuclear forces. Further, the
Soviets seem to believe that the overall "correlation of forces"
is inevitably shifting in their favor, and as it does, U.S.
flexibility in responding to crises or other contingencies is
decreasing proportionally — including the U.S. propensity to
resort to "nuclear diplomacy". Nuclear weapons will be
indispensible to Soviet foreign and defense policy objectives as
long as capitalist states possess them.
D. Soviet Views of Crisis Escalation
as a Path to Nuclear War
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, surprise attack was the key
scenario against which the adequacy of Soviets forces was
evaluated, and to which their doctrines and strategies were
addressed. As the Soviets developed a mature and substantial
survivable retaliatory capability in the late 1960s, that concern
was replaced by the crisis escalation scenario:
Today, it appears that the broad sweep of Soviet force
planning is guided by the belief that a nuclear war between
the United States and the Soviet Union would most likely
occur in the context of some crisis or conflict rather than
arise spontaneously [i.e. as a "bolt from the blue"]. '
The possibility of nuclear escalation occuring as the result
of a superpower crisis "is one of the primary doctrinal
... A Q
contingencies in Soviet force posture planning." Detente, in
the Soviet view, does not eliminate the inevitability of
continued ideological struggle between the two systems, or of
that struggle to generate occasional localized periods of
A *7
Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to
Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph
S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks. Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding
Nuclear War , (New York: Norton, 1985), p. 178.
48 Ibid.
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heightened tensions as the declining capitalist system reacts to
the unfavorable shift in the "correlation of forces" toward
Soviet moral, political, and military superiority.
As long as capitalist states armed with nuclear weapons
exist, the possibility of nuclear war exists. Therefore the
requirement for continued readiness to respond decisively to such
a contingency will exist. By definition, it is the "reactionary"
nature of modern capitalism that "starts" wars. Soviet responses
will be, again by definition, defensive. Soviet responses will
in all likelihood include preemption and some combination of
active and passive defense, in order to limit damage to the
homeland, and provide for the successful prosecution of the war
effort.
The success of the Soviet reponse to nuclear crisis
escalation depends heavily on the correct assessment by Soviet
leaders of available strategic warning indicators.
The Soviets do not necessarily feel obligated to assist the
United States in deterring, preventing, or reducing the
consequences of political, diplomatic, or military crises.
Political Scientist Alexander George has concluded that, by
signing the "Basic Principles Agreement" of May 1972, designed to
promote crisis prevention and control and reduce the risks of
nuclear war between the superpowers, the Soviets "believed they
had committed themselves to cooperate to prevent only those
crises that threatened to result in a war with the United
States." 49
Nevertheless, the Soviets probably take the threat of
nuclear crisis escalation very seriously, and approach this
possibility with a great deal of caution. Soviet crisis
management principles and approaches are examined in the
paragraphs below.
49 Alexander L. George, "Crisis Prevention Reexamined," in
Alexander George, ed. , Managing U.S. -Soviet Rivalry: Problems of
Crisis Prevention
,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 368.
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E. Soviet Approaches to Crisis Management
One of the conclusions Hannes Adomeit reached in his book on
Soviet risk-taking and crisis behavior was "the surprising degree
to which Soviet behavior. . . reflected operational principles of
the traditional Bolshevik belief system." 50 On the basis of a
thorough examination of two cases, the Berlin crises of 1948 and
1961, Adomeit deduced a series of operational principles that
guide Soviet approaches to crises. They are instructive both for
their insights into Soviet thinking, as well as for their
strategic significance. The points enumerated below are derived
from Dr. Adomeit 's deduced operational principles of Soviet
crisis behavior:
(1) Do not embark on forward operations against an opponent
which are not carefully calculated in advance and move
forward only after careful preparation.
(2) Carefully prepare the ground psychologically, make
every attempt to demoralize the adversary, and soften
his potential resistance by an alternation of severe
pressure and holding out the prospect of compromise.
(3) Push to the limit, engage in pursuit of an opponent who
begins to retreat or make concessions, but know when to
stop; resist from the start any encroachment by the
opponent, no matter how slight it appears to be, but
don't yield to enemy provocations and retreat before
superior force.
(4) Avoid the direct use of military force and use proxies
wherever possible.
(5) Before engaging in forward operations carefully
construct a fall-back position so as to meet
unexpectedly high resistance by the adversary.
(6) Do not settle for a single probability estimate of
unwanted risks that may develop in the future, but
engage in sequential analysis.
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(7) Never lose sight of the political objectives to be
achieved, and in pursuing them do not let yourself be
diverted by false notions of bourgeois morality.
(8) Resist false bourgeois notions of pride and prestige.
Taken as a whole, these principles imply an assumption that
time is on the side of the Soviets. The emphasis of these
principles on caution, preparation, determination, and clarity of
goals may profitably be considered by American naval planners.
F. Summary
A number of points are suggested by the foregoing
discussion. First, Soviet caution with regard to nuclear crises
is evidenced by the record of Soviet crisis behavior. Second,
the Soviets have a substantial nuclear capability deployed at
sea, as shown in Table 6 above, and believe that significant
political and military benefits accrue from their nuclear
arsenal. Third, the current condition of nuclear parity, or even
Soviet superiority, favors Soviet aggressive behavior on the
margins of the East-West conflict. Fourth, Soviet military
doctrine emphasizes preemption and damage limitation as
appropriate defensive responses to strategic warning that an
enemy is preparing an imminent attack on the Soviet homeland.
These points should illustrate the seriousness with which
U.S. naval planners must consider the Soviet threat to maritime
forces. The Soviets obviously do not subscribe to Western
concepts of "crisis stability" with its emphasis on disregarding
or devaluing preemption as a viable policy alternative. This
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: LONG-RANGE PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES
The following paragraphs summarize the major points of the
foregoing analysis.
1) Strategic nuclear weapons appear to have played
significant, possibly even decisive, roles in terms of crisis
response and management up to the mid-1970s. Prior to 1974, all
15 documented case where the U.S. flexed its strategic nuclear
muscle, crises were ended on terms favorable to the United
States, and ended quickly. Of course, during most of this period
the United States enjoyed unquestioned strategic nuclear
superiority. Since 1974, the United States has not redeployed or
alerted strategic nuclear forces in response to a crisis. The
reasons for this may include the change in the strategic balance,
the establishment of agreements on preventing nuclear war, the
personal predilections of recent American leaders, or any number
of other factors relating to the international or domestic
environment within which those decisions are considered.
2) The literature on nuclear crisis management neglects to
consider the role of maritime tactical nuclear forces, and may
reflect the questionable assumption that such forces have no
relevance to crisis response requirements, or that their role is
limited to NATO Central Front contingencies.
3) Current crisis management wisdom may rely too heavily on
the Cuban missile crisis as the archetypical example of
successful nuclear crisis management. However, the unique
circumstances surrounding that particular crisis may render it
unsuitable for such a role. Current crisis management wisdom may
also discount the deterrent value of maritime nuclear forces, and
appears to make prevention of a war at any cost the ultimate
CO
Although two authorities conclude that the U.S. has on
several occasions threatened to involve nuclear forces. See
Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart, "Dangerous Shortcut," New
Republic
. 26 July 1980, pp. 13-15.
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objective (rather than the successful achievement of supreme
national interests)
.
4) The Navy is the service of choice in military responses
to foreign crises. National security policy explicitly directs
the Navy to be prepared to undertake operations in peace, crisis,
and war environments. Official Navy policy is responsive to such
directives. The Maritime Strategy, in particular, recognizes the
importance of naval crisis response capabilities, and the
importance of deterring conflicts before they become full-fledged
wars.
Along these lines, an overview of public sources of
information on U.S. Navy tactical nuclear assets shows a widely
dispersed substantial capability for responding to nuclear
contingencies. Due to the diversity and dispersal of maritime
theater nuclear warfare capabilities, there is a high probability
of such forces becoming indirectly involved in naval crisis
management operations, if only by their inadvertant presence.
5) The ability of the Navy to successfully execute the
Maritime Strategy could be significantly enhanced by adopting
policies and guidelines relating to the role of sea-based nuclear
weapons before, during, and after periods of crisis. In
particular, maritime nuclear weapons may enhance naval crisis
management by:
o promoting strategic deterrence;
o signaling U.S. resolve to counter Soviet escalatory
actions (while avoiding increasing Soviet incentives
for preemption should the conflict go nuclear)
;
o enhancing the U.S. capability to respond to a wide
range of nuclear and non-nuclear threats;
o demonstrating to allies the depth of U.S. commitment to
maintain alliance interests and counter Soviet and non-
Soviet nuclear threats to allied territory;
o fielding a capability to handle specific war-fighting
missions should the crisis escalate to all-out war.
- 42
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Conversely, sea-based nuclear weapons might impede naval crisis
management by:
intimidating allies or neutral countries politically
committed domestically to nuclear free zones;
posing opportunities for preempting naval nuclear
assets should a general nuclear war occur;
provoking Soviet involvement, obliging the Soviets to
extend nuclear guarantees to allies who might feel
implicitly or explicitly threatened by U.S. nuclear
weapons; and,
displacing conventional munitions that may be more
applicable in limited combat situations.
The U.S. Navy must consider any crisis as a potential
prelude to armed hostilities, and it must be prepared to
transition effectively and successfuly to higher levels of
conflict at the direction of the national command authorities
should the situation and U.S. national interests so require.
Naval policy and fleet doctrine should exploit the positive
effects of nuclear-capable assets on crisis management efforts.
Conversely, naval policy and fleet doctrine must be prepared to
mitigate the negative impact of the presence of naval nuclear
weapons in crisis situations. Some general recommendations might
include the following:
maintaining discrete deployments, avoiding drawing
public attention to the disposition and employment of
navy nuclear assets (i.e., continuing the policy of
"neither confirm nor deny")
;
avoiding undue concentration of naval nuclear assets in
crisis zones; and,
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avoiding explicit or implicit nuclear threats against
non-nuclear countries with security ties to the Soviet
Union, or countries within reach of Soviet nuclear
assets, unless the U.S. is prepared to deal with the
consequences.
Other specific implications and recommendations are
discussed below.
1 . Objectives and Planning Principles for Nuclear Crisis
Management . U.S. naval planning for crisis management should, of
course, insure the widest possible latitude for NCA options in
support of national interests. Many of the principles governing
employment of naval nuclear assets for purposes of deterrence,
escalation control, and war termination apply to nuclear crisis
management at sea.
Official U.S. planning objectives regarding nuclear war
involve three dimensions: deterrence, escalation control should
deterrence fail, and war termination on favorable terms should
escalation control in turn fail. These three objectives provide
a tiered approach to planning for the event of nuclear war.
Planning objectives for dealing with nuclear crises should
reflect the same tiered approach. Such objectives should
include:
(1) deterrence : it should be U.S. policy to deter or prevent
crises situations from occuring or from becoming nuclear
crises that are detrimental to U.S. national interests;
(2) escalation control : should the U.S. fail to deter a
crisis, or prevent one from occuring, the U.S. should be
prepared to control it from escalating to a nuclear crisis,
or to a conventional or nuclear war; and,
(3) crisis termination : should U.S. efforts to prevent a
crisis from escalating to a nuclear crisis, or to full-scale
armed hostilities, it should be U.S. policy to terminate the
hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.
2. Naval Nuclear Weapons Missions in Times of Crisis . The
maritime nuclear-capable forces of the United States must be
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capable of sustained operations in crises. This will require
stringent safety and control procedures, as well as enhanced
operational security.
In times of crisis the missions of maritime TNF should
include: deterring the use of nuclear weapons by hostile nuclear-
equipped forces against U.S. sea, air, or land forces; signalling
U.S. intent to control the escalation process; and, should
deterrence fail, defeating the enemy's naval forces and land-
based threats to U.S. naval forces.
Effective, credible, and well-deployed maritime TNF will
enhance crisis management through reducing vulnerability to
preemption; fielding dual-capable, multi-mission forces;
threatening counter-strikes to enemy initiatives; and by
supporting the U.S. ability to dominate the escalation process.
3. Fleet Doctrine for Nuclear Crisis Management . Standing
instructions for fleet deployment and operations should continue
the current practice of neither confirming nor denying the
presence of nuclear weapons on naval ships.
Fleet doctrine for nuclear crisis management may have to
account for the fact that a given platform's conventional force
missions will most often determine that platform's deployment and
operations. Some fleet doctrine issues for consideration by Navy
strategic planners include: conflicts in operational requirements
for conventional versus nuclear operations; fleet/battle group
spacing for reducing or preventing multiple kills from single
nuclear detonations; and, AAW and ASW missions in conventional
versus nuclear environments.
Fleet doctrine should also consider the implications of
joint exercises involving allied maritime nuclear forces. The
extent to which the U.S. will have to coordinate crisis
response/management actions with U.S. allies will depend, of
course, on the circumstances of a given crisis. The following
issues may need to be addressed:
(1) French and/or British nuclear assets may be involved,
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thus a crisis may involve nuclear weapons of a third party (not
necessarily always an ally) and may threaten to escalate to
exchanges of nuclear weapons without U.S. or Soviet intervention;
(2) the U.S. may need to take into account possible allied
objectives in a given crisis situation;
(3) recommendations for coordination of naval nuclear forces
with U.S. allies may have to be considered.
4 . Naval Nuclear Weapons Force Posture and Capabilities .
This category of implications involves considering overall U.S.
policy, threats, tactics and operations, system and personnel
survivability, as well as training and readiness.
Maritime TNF force posture and capabilities should, of
course, be responsive to and compatible with overall U.S. for
nuclear deterrence and stability. They should contribute to
deterrence of nuclear attacks on the U.S. or its allies, and, in
the event deterrence fails, promote escalation control and
favorable war termination.
Maritime TNF force posture and capabilities will need to
take the threat into account. In this regard, Navy strategic
planners must consider the maritime TNF balance, Soviet behavior
and policy for responding to potentially nuclear crises, Soviet
theater nuclear warfare policy, as well as the emerging Soviet
and Third World cruise and ballistic missile threats.
Tactics and operations issues revolve around improving force
survivability, and reducing command and control vulnerabilities
to nuclear effects.
The U.S. Navy should be sensitive to the potential for
crisis situations to draw-down or degrade forces and/or platforms
dedicated to SIOP missions or strategic reserve force missions.
To what extent are these forces exposed to involvement in crisis
situations?
Further, Navy strategic planners may wish to consider the
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importance of encouraging serious and sustained thought on
maritime theater nuclear warfare (and its relationship to war on
land) ; implementing, improving, or upgrading formal training on
maritime theater nuclear warfare employment and effects; and, the
advisability of large-scale fleet exercises simulating a maritime
nuclear environment.
5. Crisis Termination Policy . Standing down from a crisis
is an area often ignored by contemporary analyses of crisis
management. The deleterious effects of prolonged deployments in
situations of heightened tension may strain crew morale and
performance as well as equipment readiness and effectiveness.
Could this present a window of vulnerability to enemy surprise
attack, or to the enemy suddenly and effectively re-escalating
the conflict on more advantageous terms?
Does the process of moving forces during de-escalation pose
the danger of being misinterpreted by other crisis participants,
or of spurring the crisis further? How can the vulnerability of
standing forces down be reduced?
a) by incremental, phased de-escalation of forces engaged in
the crisis?
b) by reaching a mutual understanding on standing down
procedures among the crisis participants?
On the other hand, how does one protect the operational
security of ones forces when exchanging information on standing
down among the crisis participants?
These questions are among those raised by this report that
warrant further study. Hopefully the sensitivity of naval
planners to issues surrounding the involvement of nuclear forces
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